mewsings in January 2025

Published in 1910, The Human Chord is perhaps Blackwood’s most weird-fiction-friendly novel, which makes it fitting it has been republished by the British Library as part of their Tales of the Weird series.

The story centres on 28-year-old Robert Spinrobin, a somewhat ineffectual fellow, wandering through life via a series of secretarial posts (much as Blackwood himself did for a while), but with an ultimate aim of somehow, somewhere, finding his very own “authoritative adventure of the soul”. He responds to an unusual ad:

“WANTED, by Retired Clergyman, Secretarial Assistant with courage and imagination. Tenor voice and some knowledge of Hebrew essential; single; unworldly. Apply Philip Skale.”

Applying, Spinny (as he’s mostly known) finds himself in an isolated house in Wales. Skale is an impressive figure, tall, deep-voiced, and intent on pursuing a certain “philosophical speculation” “wheresoever it may lead”. This speculation is that “Everything in nature has its name, and he who has the power to call a thing by its proper name can make it obedient to his will.” Some names, though, are more complex to speak than others, particularly when it comes to “the so-called ‘Angels’; for these are in reality Forces of immense potency, vast spiritual Powers, Qualities, and the like”, who are “all evocable by correct utterance of their names.” Skale wants to utter “a certain complex and stupendous name”, for which he needs four voices: himself (bass), his housekeeper (alto), her niece Miriam (soprano), and a tenor. So far, twelve young men have applied for the latter role, but all have failed to harmonise, in various subtle ways, with the others. Spinny, though, fits perfectly — not only providing the tenor, but instantly clicking in other ways with young Miriam. (Though is there a significance in his being the thirteenth applicant?)

There are, though, risks. Housekeeper Mrs Mawle is deaf and has a withered arm thanks to Skale’s fumbled attempt to speak her true name. To mispronounce the angelic names is “to attract upon yourself the destructive qualities of these Powers”, and unleash far greater levels of mayhem. Skale, however, is utterly confident that with his new assistant’s E-flat, they can proceed.

Spinny, of course, wonders what that “complex and stupendous name” is — and in this, it has to be said, he’s alone, because it’s obvious there can only be one name Skale is aiming for, and that’s the top one, a name so complex that even four human voices will be inadequate. Skale has, it turns out, already succeeded in somehow trapping the four sounds that make up but the first syllable of that name, which are confined (thanks to a combination of coloured drapes, wax forms, and other esoteric devices) in four of the rooms of his large house. Each of the four members of his “human chord” will utter the sound that unleashes these sounds, which will lead to the formation of a greater sound — itself but the first of the four syllables of the Great Name he’s ultimately intending to speak.

And the aim of sounding that name? To both become part of the named entity and to command it — to become, Skale says, “as gods”. Spinny — little, comical Spinny — is bowled over by Skale and agrees to do whatever he says. But doubts creep in, particularly as his relationship with Miriam deepens — if “deepens” is the word, for the pair are as shallow as puddles. Both are innocents, described as “two bewildered children” before Skale’s awesome endeavour, though this is not the childlike nature-mystic type of innocence that really works in Blackwood’s fiction; these two are more comically innocent, wide-eyed and somewhat blank-minded in the face of everything that’s going on. When Spinny agrees with Skale that, yes, they will become “as gods”, I can’t help wondering what Spinny would do if he actually became “as a god”. And anyway, you can’t have an “adventure of the soul” if you are “as a god”, because a god can’t have peril, mystery, or wonder, nor can its already-ultimate soul grow or change as a result.

Like Blackwood’s 1911 novel The Centaur, this is a story whose main character is presented with two worlds, and has to choose between them. In The Centaur, O’Malley was caught between cosmic nature-mysticism and the modern world of “Humanity and Civilisation”, and, like Blackwood, opted for the former. Here, Spinny is presented with a choice between the world of magic, power, knowledge and being “as gods”, and the more human world of love for Miriam. Skale is a magician who never seems to question that anyone would want anything but power, knowledge and godhood. But when, at the end, he sings his note and the world starts to transform, the vision Blackwood presents is far more of the sort found in The Centaur — where nature is one, already-perfect thing, with no need for a magician-figure to take charge of it — so Skale might not have been satisfied with the results even if he had succeeded:

“The outer semblance of the old earth appeared to melt away and reveal that heart of clean and dazzling wonder which burns ever at its inmost core—the naked spirit divined by poets and mystics since the beginning of time. It was a new heaven and a new earth that pulsed below them… All nature knew, from the birds that started out of sleep into passionate singing, to the fish that stirred in the depths of the sea, and the wild deer that sprang alert in their wintry coverts, scenting an eternal spring. For the earth rolled up as a scroll, shaking the outworn skin of centuries from her face, and suffering all her rocky structure to drop away and disclose the soft and glowing loveliness of an actual being—a being most tenderly and exquisitely alive.”

This is a world of “poets and mystics”, not power-seeking magicians, and in the end, Spinney realises that “the great adventure he sought was only the supreme adventure of a very wonderful love”.

Mike Ashley has called The Human Chord Blackwood’s “one complete hermetic novel” arising out of his time in the Order of the Golden Dawn, which Blackwood joined in 1900. But such magickal occultism was only ever a step on the way to the nature mysticism that was Blackwood’s true “note”, and I can’t help feeling The Human Chord is Blackwood’s dismissal of the quest for magical power as opposed to seeking oneness with a mystical Nature. (Meanwhile, Aleister Crowley’s somewhat snide review of The Human Chord, in his own journal The Equinox in March 1911 — signed “Georgos” — called it the result of “indigestion brought on by a surfeit of ill-cooked Theosophy”.)

This is probably Blackwood’s most accessible novel, if you’re looking for something like the sort of weird fiction he’s known for, but The Centaur is far more characteristic of what he was really aiming at. Spinny is perhaps just a little too shallow to make The Human Chord rise above a parable about the overweening quest for power in a world where simply being human might, in the end, be much more satisfying.

I’ve looked at cosmic horror before on this blog in the case of individual works—is Stephen King’s Revival cosmic horror? or Lem’s Solaris?—and certainly some of my all-time favourites, from Alien to HP Lovecraft, are, but I’ve never been sure I could properly define “cosmicism”, or say why the horror in cosmic horror is “cosmic”. Ellen Greenham, in this 2022 book from Hippocampus Press (full title: After Engulfment: Cosmicism and Neocosmicism in H. P. Lovecraft, Philip K. Dick, Robert A. Heinlein, and Frank Herbert), on the other hand, can:

“The principal tenets of cosmicism are that the universe operates as an indifferent mechanism, without purpose or direction, and the human creature is not only insignificant but exists as a biological mutation or accident of elemental and chemical stellar processes.”

I’d add—or at least, this is an aspect I’ve latched onto in my look at, say, Roadside Picnic—that cosmicism presents the universe as being vast, and far weirder than we could ever expect, to the point of being overwhelmingly incomprehensible. (Though this could be seen as a bleaker variant on the sense-of-wonder of science fiction.)

In my Mewsings on Stapledon’s Last and First Men I called cosmicism the religious aspect of atheism, but I might instead say it’s a worldview not just with no God, but with an oppressive God-shaped absence, to the point where the universe seems not merely indifferent but actively hostile. As Greenham says:

“The hallmark of cosmicism embodied within Lovecraft’s corpus is the apparent lack of anything even remotely like human emotion and morality being employed in the process of human eradication. Lovecraft’s others simply swat the human creature as that creature in turn swats flies.”

Why “cosmic”, then? To the Ancient Greeks, cosmos was opposed to chaos; it was order and certainty. The idea of the “cosmos”, then, relies on having a cosmological model—an ordered mental model of how the universe works. But, as Greenham points out, such models, however accurate they may seem, inevitably fail, for “a cosmological model, like a map, is only one particular view and not the territory itself”. For her, there is always an ineradicable degree of chaos that makes the universe ultimately resist any attempt to turn it into a tame and knowable cosmos.

The horror of cosmic horror is all about incursions from the “outside”—the depths of space, other dimensions, other orders of being—but this “outside”, as Greenham says, “is simply the territory beyond the parameters of the cosmos”. “Outside” means outside one’s cosmological model. The thing that turns this into horror (as opposed to the sense-of-wonder of discovering something new), is that the outsideness is so extreme it doesn’t merely reveal flaws in the cosmological model, it shatters it so thoroughly that it destroys the protagonists’ very notion of themselves.

In cosmic horror there are usually two outcomes: madness or death. In this book, Greenham maps out an expansion of the ideas of cosmic horror into what she calls neocosmicism, and adds a third response, engulfment, a term that still captures something of the sense of fear and loss of self (as experienced by many a Lovecraft protagonist), but points to a way “the human creature” (as she refers to you and me) can move beyond a merely negative outcome:

“By choosing to be engulfed by the universe, rather than simply observe it from a distance, the human creature in neocosmicism can move beyond what stops and destroys it, to enter a vitalised engagement with the universe and with others.”

Being engulfed, one may drown, or one may (like the protagonist of Lovecraft’s “Shadow Over Innsmouth”) be transformed and take to the alien environment as one’s new home. But the transformation must be profound.

The primary Western cosmological model for centuries has been what Greenham calls “the Genesis model”, where humanity, God’s favoured creation, is “significant in its world”, and where there is a “moral code bestowed upon it by that God”. When this was assailed by the key ideas of the 19th and 20th centuries (the revolutions started by Darwin, Freud, Einstein, and others), it was replaced by “the Machine Universe”, one “without emotion or human morality”, ruled by “the cold equations” of the laws of physics. Caught between these two worldviews, you’re in what Greenham calls “the Schizophrenic Universe”, which is “no longer one stable thing or another”, “an alien and schizophrenic landscape that has become strangely separate from the human creature within it”. The way forward to a new understanding—or to a new way of relating to the universe without a full understanding—one must face the “gaping black hole between cosmos and universe” which Greenham calls the void. For, “the light,” she says, “can never be truly understood without knowledge of the darkness also”.

The void, of course, seems empty, meaningless, a frightening vacuum. But it has a useful purpose in this neocosmological process. Like Nietzsche’s abyss, its job is not so much to be stared into as to stare back: “The void is thus named because its function is to make void, to empty the full; to turn the human creature into a tabula rasa.” To accept a new notion of what the universe is, you must—painfully, if necessary—get rid of the old notions first, even if it means throwing everything out.

At this point, the universe becomes “a proving ground”, where “the human creature enters a relationship of ‘lethal proximity’ with the universe”. A prime example is the planet Arrakis in Herbert’s Dune, whose harsh conditions have resulted in the super-tough Fremen, a people who’ve learned to live with the “cold equations” of their particular environment. The apparent hostility of the universe, then, becomes a spur: the successful entrant into the proving ground is “facing imminent threat so that… [it] might also engage its vitality”. Ultimately, though, the idea is not to just become a machine for survival, but a human being that survives, one that seeks to find “whether it is possible to survive in the cold equations with emotion and empathy intact”.

All this points to a new relationship with the vast, sometimes hostile-seeming universe. Against the apparent insignificance of humanity that’s a given in cosmic horror, Greenham’s neocosmicism points to how the very hostility of the “proving ground” can lead to a new sense of significance: the proving ground may weed out those who can’t survive its ultra-harsh conditions, but “Gardeners do not remove weeds for the sake of the removal”. There is, then, an ultimate aim: to turn oneself into a creature that fits this universe, perhaps even adds something to it. This can, Greenham says, even be a liberating view, for:

“…in remaining indifferent to whether the human creature succeeds or fails, the universe nullifies any sense that creature might have of striving for a final result, thereby releasing that creature from the requirement—real or illusory—to be bound by a sense of finitude.”

In the end, the idea is to no longer see the individual human being as a thing contained in, and oppressed by, a vast universe, like a pea rattling around in an enormous box, but as a part of it, and perhaps even (in John Wyndham’s phrase) “the crown of creation”—the human that triumphs against incredible odds, and retains their humanity, and not because a god deemed that it was always going to be so, but through their own efforts.

Reading Greenham’s book, I kept thinking of one author she doesn’t mention, Olaf Stapledon, in particular his Last and First Men. Stapledon has some of his future races of humankind actively engage with the sort of ideas Greenham writes about. They see their role as surviving in the universe as it is, not as they wish it to be, and being prepared to accept that the end must ultimately be a tragedy—the universe’s “cold equations” (literally cold: they face the dying of the sun) will win out, but in the meantime, their role is to seek the fulfilment of their particular nature within this universe: “man is a fair spirit, whom a star conceived and a star kills”. And Stapledon adds something I think Greenham doesn’t mention, as far as I recall, a willed returned to that science-fictional sense of wonder. Stapledon’s future humans “render the universe that intelligent worship which, they felt, it demanded”, and learn to “admire the Real as it is revealed to us, and salute its dark-bright form with joy”.

It’s an excellent study of an idea that could really be applied to so much I’ve previously written about on this blog. (Reading it didn’t require an extensive knowledge of the writers she covers—I’m certainly not very familiar with Heinlein, or with Herbert beyond the first Dune book. I’m tempted now to read some more in the Dune series; not so much with Heinlein.)

You can hear Greenham interviewed on episode 152 of the Udda Ting Podcast (don’t worry about the Swedish intro, the interview itself is in English), on most podcast apps or here at Soundcloud.